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Abstract
In this paper we study a game where every player is to choose a vertex (facility) in a given
undirected graph. All vertices (customers) are then assigned to closest facilities and a player’s
payoff is the number of customers assigned to it. We show that deciding the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for a given graph is NP-hard which to our knowledge is the first result of this kind
for a zero-sum game. We also introduce a new measure, the social cost discrepancy, defined as
the ratio of the costs between the worst and the best Nash equilibria. We show that the social
cost discrepancy in our game is Ω(
√
n/k) and O(
√
kn), where n is the number of vertices and
k the number of players.
1 Introduction
Voronoi game is a widely studied game which plays on a continuous space, typically a 2-dimensional
rectangle. Players alternatively place points in the space. Then the Voronoi diagram is considered.
Every player gains the total surface of the Voronoi cells of his points [1]. This game is related to
the facility location problem, where the goal is to choose a set of k facilities in a bipartite graph,
so to minimize the sum of serving cost and facility opening cost [8].
We consider the discrete version of the Voronoi game which plays on a given graph instead on a
continuous space. Whereas most papers about these games [3, 5] study the existence of a winning
strategy, or computing the best strategy for a player, we study in this paper the Nash equilibria.
Formally the discrete Voronoi game plays on a given undirected graph G(V,E) with n = |V |
and k players. Every player has to choose a vertex (facility) from V , and every vertex (customer) is
assigned to the closest facilities. A player’s payoff is the number of vertices assigned to his facility.
We define the social cost as the sum of the distances to the closest facility over all vertices.
We consider a few typical questions about Nash Equilibria:
• Do Nash equilibria exist?
• What is the computational complexity for finding one?
• If they exist, can one be found from an arbitrary intital strategy profile with the best-response
dynamic?
• It they exist, how different are their social costs?
∗LIX, CNRS UMR 7161, Ecole Polytechnique 91128 Palaiseau, France. Supported by ANR Alpage.
1
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
70
20
54
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
3 A
pr
 20
07
The existence of Nash equilibria is a graph property for a fixed number of players, and we give
examples of graphs for which there exist Nash equilibria and examples for which there are none.
We show that deciding this graph property is an NP-hard problem.
For particular graphs, namely the cycles, we characterize all Nash equilibria. We show that
the best-response dynamic does not converge to a Nash equilibria on these graphs, but does for a
modified version of this game.
Finally we introduce a new measure. Assume that there are Nash equilibria for k players on
graph G. Let A be the largest social cost of a Nash equilibrium, B the smallest social cost of a
Nash equilibrium, and C the smallest social cost of any strategy profile, which is not necessarily
an equilibrium. Then the ratio A/C is called the price of anarchy [7], B/C is called the price of
stability [2]. We study a different ratio A/B, which we call the social cost discrepancy of G. The
social cost discrepancy of the game is defined as the worst discrepancy over all instances of the
game. The idea is that a small social cost discrepancy guarantees that the social costs of Nash
equilibria do not differ too much, and measures a degree of choice in the game. In some settings
it may be unfair to compare the cost of a Nash equilibrium with the optimal cost, which may not
be attained by selfish agents. Note that this ratio is upper-bounded by the price of anarchy. We
show that the social cost discrepancy in our game is Ω(
√
n/k) and O(
√
kn). Hence for a constant
number of players we have tight bounds.
2 The game
For this game we need to generalize the notion of vertex partition of a graph: A generalized partition
of a graph G(V,E) is a set of n-dimensional non-negative vectors, which sum up to the vector with
1 in every component, for n = |V |.
The Voronoi game on graphs consists of:
• A graph G(V,E) and k players. We assume k < n for n = |V |, otherwise the game has a
trivial structure. The graph induces a distance between vertices d : V ×V → N∪{∞}, which
is defined as the minimal number of edges of any connecting path, or infinite if the vertices
are disconnected.
• The strategy set of each player is V . A strategy profile of k players is a vector f = (f1, . . . , fk)
associating each player to a vertex.
• For every vertex v ∈ V — called customer — the distance to the closest facility is denoted as
d(v, f) := minfi d(v, fi). Customers are assigned in equal fractions to the closest facilities as
follows. The strategy profile f defines the generalized partition {F1, . . . , Fk}, where for every
player 1 ≤ i ≤ k and every vertex v ∈ V ,
Fi,v =
{
1
|arg minjd(v,fj)| if d(v, fi) = d(v, f)
0 otherwise.
We call Fi the Voronoi cell of player i. Now the payoff of player i is the (fractional) amount
of customers assigned to it (see figure 1), that is pi :=
∑
v∈V Fi,v.
The best response for player i in the strategy profile f is a vertex f ′i ∈ V maximizing the player
i’s payoff in the strategy profile (f−i, f ′i) which is a shorthand for the profile which equals f , except
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Figure 1: A strategy profile of a graph (players are dots) and the corresponding payoffs.
that the strategy of player i is f ′i . If player i can strictly improve his payoff by choosing another
strategy, we say that player i is unhappy in f , otherwise he is happy. The best response dynamic
is the process of repeatedly choosing an arbitrary unhappy player, and change it to an arbitrary
best response. A pure Nash equilibrium is defined as a fixed point to the best response dynamic, or
equivalently as a strategy profile where all players are happy. In this paper we consider only pure
Nash equilibria, so we omit from now on the adjective “pure”.
We defined players’ payoffs in such a way, that there is a subtle difference between the Voronoi
game played on graphs and the Voronoi game played on a continuous surface. Consider a situation
where a player i moves to a location already occupied by a single player j, then in the continuous
case player i gains exactly a half of the previous payoff of player j (since it is now shared with i).
However, in our setting (the discrete case), player i can sometimes gain more than a half of the
previous payoff of player j (see figure 2).
Also note that the best responses for a player in our game are computable in polynomial time,
whereas for the Voronoi game in continuous space, the problem seems hard [4].
A simple observation leads to the following bound on the players payoff.
Lemma 1 In a Nash equilibrium the payoff pi of every player i is bounded by n/2k < pi < 2n/k.
Proof: If a player gains p and some other player moves to the same location then both payoffs are
at least p/2. Therefore the ratio between the largest and the smallest payoffs among all players can
be at most 2. If all players have the same payoff, it must be exactly n/k, since the payoffs sum up
to n. Otherwise there is at least one player who gains strictly less than n/k, and another player
who gains strictly more than n/k. This concludes the proof. 
3 Example: the cycle graph
Let G(V,E) be the cycle on n vertices with V = {vi : i ∈ Zn} and E = {(vi, vi+1) : i ∈ Zn}, where
addition is modulo n. The game plays on the undirected cycle, but it will be convenient to fix an
orientation. Let u0, . . . , u`−1 be the distinct facilities chosen by k players in a strategy profile f
with ` ≤ k, numbered according to the orientation of the cycle. For every j ∈ Z`, let cj ≥ 1 be the
number of players who choose the facility uj and let dj ≥ 1 be the length of the directed path from
uj to uj+1 following the orientation of G. Now the strategy profile is defined by these 2` numbers,
up to permutation of the players. We decompose the distance into dj = 1+2aj + bj , for 0 ≤ bj ≤ 1,
where 2aj + bj is the number of vertices between facilities uj and uj+1. So if bj = 1, then there is
a vertex in midway at equal distance from uj and uj+1.
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With these notations the payoff of player i located on facility uj is
pi :=
bj−1
cj−1 + cj
+
aj−1 + 1 + aj
cj
+
bj
cj + cj+1
.
All Nash equilibria are explicitly characterized by the following lemma. The intuition is that
the cycle is divided by the players into segments of different length, which roughly differ at most
by a factor 2. The exact statement is more subtle because several players can be located at a same
facility and the payoff is computed differently depending on the parity of the distances between
facilities.
Lemma 2 For a given strategy profile, let γ be the minimal payoff among all players, i.e: γ :=
min{pi|1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Then this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all j ∈ Z`:
(i) cj ≤ 2
(ii) dj ≤ 2γ
(iii) If cj = 1 and dj−1 = dj = 2γ then cj−1 = cj+1 = 2.
(iv) If cj−1 = 2, cj = 1, cj+1 = 1 then dj−1 is odd.
If cj−1 = 1, cj = 1, cj+1 = 2 then dj is odd.
Lemma 3 On the cycle graph, the best response dynamic does not converge.
Proof: Figure 2 shows an example of a graph, where the best response dynamic can iterate forever.

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Figure 2: The best response dynamic does not converge on this graph.
However there is a slightly different Voronoi game in which the best response dynamic converges :
The Voronoi game with disjoint facilities is identical with the previous game, except that players
who are located on the same facility now gain zero.
Lemma 4 On the cycle graph, for the Voronoi game with disjoint facilities, the best response
dynamic does converge on a strategy profile in which players are located on distinct facilities.
Proof: To show convergence we use a potential function. For this purpose we define the dominance
order : Let A,B be two multisets. If |A| < |B| then A  B. If |A| = |B| ≥ 1, and maxA > maxB
then A  B. If |A| = |B| ≥ 1,maxA = maxB and A\{maxA}  B\{maxB} then A  B. This
is a total order.
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The potential function is the multiset {d0, d1, . . . , dk−1}, that is all distances between successive
occupied facilities. Player i’s payoff — renumbered conveniently — is simply (di + di+1)/2. Now
consider a best response for player i moving to a vertex not yet chosen by another player, say
between player j and j + 1. Therefore in the multiset {d0, d1, . . . , dk−1}, the values di, di+1, dj are
replaced by di + di+1, d′, d′′ for some values d′, d′′ ≥ 1 such that dj = d′ + d′′. The new potential
value is dominated by the previous one. This proves that after a finite number of iterations, the
best response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. 
4 Existence of a Nash equilibrium is NP-hard
In this section we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether for a given graph G(V,E) there is
a Nash equilibrium for k players. For this purpose we define a more general but equivalent game,
which simplifies the reduction.
In the generalized Voronoi game 〈G(V,E), U, w, k〉 we are given a graph G, a set of facilities
U ⊆ V , a positive weight function w on vertices and a number of players k. Here the set of strategies
of each player is only U instead of V . Also the payoff of a player is the weighted sum of fractions
of customers assigned to it, i.e. the payoff of player i is pi :=
∑
v∈V w(v)Fi,v.
Lemma 5 For every generalized Voronoi game 〈G(V,E), U, w, k〉 there is a standard Voronoi game
〈G′(V ′, E′), k〉 with V ⊆ V ′, which has the same set of Nash equilibria and which is such that |V ′|
is polynomial in |V | and ∑v∈V w(v).
Proof: To construct G′ we will augment G in two steps. Start with V ′ = V .
First, for every vertex u ∈ V such that w(u) > 1, let Hu be a set of w(u)− 1 new vertices. Set
V ′ = V ′ ∪Hu and connect u with every vertex from Hu.
Second, let H be a set of k(a+ 1) new vertices where a = |V ′| = ∑v∈V w(v). Set V ′ = V ′ ∪H
and connect every vertex of U with every vertex of H.
Now in G′(V ′, E′) every player’s payoff can be decomposed in the part gained from V ′\H and
the part gained from H. We claim that in a Nash equilibrium every player chooses a vertex from
U . If there is at least one player located in U , then the gain from H of any other player is 0 if
located in V ′\(U ∪ H), is 1 if located in H and is at least a + 1 if located in U . Since the total
payoff from V ′\H over all players is a, this forces all players to be located in U .
Clearly by construction, for any strategy profile f ∈ Uk, the payoffs are the same for the gener-
alized Voronoi game in G as for the standard Voronoi game in G′. Therefore we have equivalence
of the set of Nash equilibria in both games. 
Our NP-hardness proof will need the following gadget.
Lemma 6 For the graph G shown in figure 3 and k = 2 players, there is no Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We will simply show that given an arbitrary location of one player, the other player can
move to a location where he gains at least 5. Since the total payoff over both players is 9, this will
prove that there is no Nash equilibrium, since the best response dynamic does not converge.
By symmetry without loss of generality the first player is located at the vertices u1 or u2. Now
if the second player is located at u6, his payoff is at least 5. 
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Figure 3: Example of a graph with no Nash equilibrium for 2 players.
Theorem 1 Given a graph G(V,E) and a set of k players, deciding the existence of Nash equilib-
rium for k players on G is NP-complete.
Proof: The problem is clearly in NP, since best responses can be computed in polynomial time,
therefore it can be verified efficiently if a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of NP-hardness is by the reduction from 3-Partition, which is unary NP-complete
[6]. In this later problem we are given integers a1, . . . , a3m and B such that B/4 < ai < B/2
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m, ∑3mi=1 = mB and have to partition them into disjoint sets P1, . . . , Pm ⊆
{1, . . . , 3m} such that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m we have ∑i∈Pj ai = B.
We construct a weighted graph G(V,E) with the weight function w : V → N and a set U ⊆ V
such that for k = m + 1 players (m ≥ 2) there is a Nash equilibrium to the generalized Voronoi
game 〈G,U,w, k〉 if and only if there is a solution to the 3-Partition instance. We define the
constants c =
(
3m
3
)
+ 1 and d =
⌊
Bc−c+c/m
5
⌋
+ 1. The graph G consists of 3 parts. In the first part
V1, there is for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m a vertex vi of weight aic. There is also an additional vertex v0 of
weight 1. In the second part V2, there is for every triplet (i, j, k) with 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ 3m a vertex
uijk of unit weight. — Ideally we would like to give it weight zero, but there seems to be no simple
generalization of the game which allows zero weights, while preserving the set of Nash equilibria.
— Every vertex uijk is connected to v0, vi, vj and vk. The third part V3, consists of the 9 vertex
graph of figure 3 where each of the vertices u1, . . . , u9 has weight d. To complete our construction,
we define the facility set U := V2 ∪ V3.
U
w(u1,2,4) = 1
w(u1,2,3) = 1
w(u3n−2,3n−1,3n) = 1
w(v1) = a1c
w(v2) = a2c
w(v3) = a3c
w(v3n) = a3nc
w(u1) = d w(u3) = d
w(u4) = d
w(u6) = d
w(u2) = d
w(u5) = d
w(u7) = d
w(u8) = d
w(u9) = d
w(v0) = 1
w(u1,2,5) = 1
Figure 4: Reduction from 3-Partition.
First we show that if there is a solution P1, . . . , Pm to the 3-Partition instance then there is
a Nash equilibrium for this graph. Simply for every 1 ≤ q ≤ m if Pq = {i, j, k} then player q is
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assigned to the vertex uijk. Player m + 1 is assigned to u2. Now player (m + 1)’s payoff is 9d,
and the payoff of each other player q is Bc + c/m. To show that this is a Nash equilibrium we
need to show that no player can increase his payoff. There are different cases. If player m + 1
moves to a vertex uijk, his payoff will be at most 34Bc + c/(m+ 1) < 9d, no matter if that vertex
was already chosen by another player or not. If player 1 ≤ q ≤ 3m moves from vertex uijk to a
vertex u` then his gain can be at most 5d < Bc + c/m. But what can be his gain, if he moves to
another vertex ui′j′k′? In case where i = i′, j = j′, k 6= k′, aic + ajc is smaller than 34Bc because
ai + aj + ak = B and ak > B/4. Since ak′ < B/2, and player q gains only half of it, his payoff is at
most aic+ ajc+ ak′c/2 + c/m < Bc+ c/m so he again cannot improve his payoff. The other cases
are similar.
Now we show that if there is a Nash equilibrium, then it corresponds to a solution of the 3-
Partition instance. So let there be a Nash equilibrium. First we claim that there is exactly one
player in V3. Clearly if there are 2 players, this contradicts equilibrium by Lemma 6. If there are
3 players or more, then by a counting argument there are vertices vi, vj , vk which are at distance
more than one from any player. One of the players located at V3 gains at most 3d and if he moves
to uijk, his payoff would be at least 34Bc + c/m > 3d. Now if there is no player in V3, then any
player moving to u2 will gain 9d > 32Bc + c/m which is an upper bound for the payoff of players
located in V2. So we know that there is a single player in V3 and the m players in V2 must form
a partition, since otherwise there is a vertex vi ∈ V1 at distance at least 2 to any player. So, by
the previous argument, there would be a player in V2 who can increase his payoff by moving to
the other vertex in V2 as well. (He moves in such a way that his new facility is at distance 1 to
vi.) Moreover, in this partition, each player gains exactly Bc+ c/m because if one gains less, given
all weights in V1 are multiple of c, he gains at most Bc− c+ c/m and he can always augment his
payoff by moving to V3 (5d > Bc− c+ c/m). 
5 Social cost discrepancy
In this section, we study how much the social cost of Nash equilibria can differ for a given graph,
assuming Nash equilibria exist. We define the social cost of a strategy profile f as cost(f) :=∑
v∈V d(v, f). Since we assumed k < n the cost is always non-zero. The social cost discrepancy of
the game is the maximal fraction cost(f)/cost(f ′) over all Nash equilibria f, f ′. For unconnected
graphs, the social cost can be infinite, and so can be the social cost discrepancy. Therefore in this
section we consider only connected graphs.
Lemma 7 There are connected graphs for which the social cost discrepancy is Ω(
√
n/k), where n
is the number of vertices and k the number of players.
Proof: We construct a graph G as shown in figure 5. The total number of vertices in the graph is
n = k(2a + b + 2). We distinguish two strategy profiles f and f ′: the vertices occupied by f are
marked with round dots, and the vertices of f ′ are marked with triangular dots.
By straightforward verification, it can be checked that both f and f ′ are Nash equilibria.
However the social cost of f is Θ(kb + ka2) while the social cost of f ′ is Θ(kab + ka2). The ratio
between both costs is Θ(a) = Θ(
√
n/k) when b = a2 and thus the cost discrepancy is lower bounded
by this quantity. 
The radius of the Voronoi cell of player i is defined as maxv d(v, fi) where the maximum is
taken over all vertices v such that Fi,v > 0. The Delaunay triangulation is a graph Hf on the k
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Figure 5: Example of a graph with high social cost discrepancy.
players. There is an edge (i, j) in Hf either if there is a vertex v in G with Fi,v > 0 and Fj,v > 0
or if there is an edge (v, v′) in G with Fi,v > 0 and Fj,v′ > 0.
We will need to partition the Delaunay triangulation into small sets, which are 1-dominated
and contain more than one vertex. We call these sets stars: For a given graph G(V,E) a vertex set
A ⊆ V is a star if |A| ≥ 2, and there is a center vertex v0 ∈ A such that for every v ∈ A, v 6= v0 we
have (v0, v) ∈ E. Note that our definition allows the existence of additional edges between vertices
from A.
Lemma 8 For any connected graph G(V,E), V can be partitioned into stars.
Proof: We define an algorithm to partition V into stars.
As long as the graph contains edges, we do the following. We start choosing an edge: If there
is a vertex u with a unique neighbor v, then we choose the edge (u, v); otherwise we choose an
arbitrary edge (u, v). Consider the vertex set consisting of u, v as well as of any vertex w that
would be isolated when removing edge (u, v). Add this set to the partition, remove it as well as
adjacent edges from G and continue.
Clearly the set produced in every iteration is a star. Also when removing this set from G, the
resulting graph does not contain an isolated vertex. This property is an invariant of this algorithm,
and proves that it ends with a partition of G into stars. 
Note that, when a graph is partitioned into stars, the centers of these stars form a dominating
set of this graph. Nevertheless, vertices in a dominating set are not necessarily centers of any
star-partition of a given graph.
The following lemma states that given two different Nash equilibria f and f ′, every player in f
is not too far from some player in f ′. For this purpose we partition the Delaunay triangulation Hf
into stars, and bound the distance from any player of a star to f ′ by some value depending on the
star.
Lemma 9 Let f be an equilibrium and A be a star of a star partition of the Delaunay triangulation
Hf . Let r be the maximal radius of the Voronoi cells over all players i ∈ A. Then, for any
equilibrium f ′, there exists a player f ′j such that d(fi, f
′
j) ≤ 6r for every i ∈ A.
Proof: Let U = {v ∈ V : mini∈A d(v, fi) ≤ 4r}. If we can show that there is a facility f ′j ∈ U we
would be done, since by definition of U there would be a player i ∈ A such that d(fi, f ′j) ≤ 4r and
the distance between any pair of facilities of A is at most 2r. This would conclude the lemma.
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Figure 6: Illustration of lemma 9.
So for a proof by contradiction, assume that in the strategy profile f ′ there is no player located
in U . Now consider the player with smallest payoff in f ′. His payoff is not more than n/k. However
if this player would choose as a facility the center of the star A, then he would gain strictly more:
By the choice of r, any vertex in W is at distance at most 3r to the center of the star. However, by
assumption and definition of U , any other facility of f ′ would be at distance strictly greater than
3r to any vertex in W . So the player would gain at least all vertices around it at distance at most
3r, which includes W . Since any player’s payoff is strictly more than n/2k by Lemma 1, and since
a star contains at least two facilities by definition, this player would gain strictly more than n/k,
contradicting that f ′ is an equilibrium. This concludes the proof. 
Theorem 2 For any connected graph G(V,E) and any number of players k the social cost discrep-
ancy is O(
√
kn), where n = |V |.
Proof: Let f, f ′ be arbitrary equilibria on G(V,E). We will consider a generalized partition of V
and for each part bound the cost of f ′ by c
√
kn times the cost of f for some constant c.
For a non-negative n-dimensional vector W we define the cost restricted to W as costW (f) =∑
v∈V Wv · d(v, f). Now the cost of f would write as the sum of costW (f) over the vectors W from
some fixed generalized partition.
Fix a star partition of the Delaunay triangulation Hf . Let A be an arbitrary star from this
partition, a = |A|, and W be the sum of the corresponding Voronoi cells, i.e. W = ∑i∈A Fi. We
will show that costW (f ′) = O(
√
kn · costW (f)), which would conclude the proof. There will be two
cases k ≤ n/4 and k > n/4.
By the previous lemma there is a vertex f ′j such that d(fi, f
′
j) ≤ 6r for all i ∈ A, where r is the
largest radius of all Voronoi cells corresponding to the star A. So the cost of f ′ restricted to the
vector W is
costW (f ′) =
∑
v∈V
Wv · d(v, f ′) ≤
∑
v∈V
Wv · d(v, f ′j)
=
∑
v∈V
∑
i∈A
Fi,v · d(v, f ′j)
≤
∑
v∈V
∑
i∈A
Fi,v ·
(
d(v, fi) + d(fi, f ′j)
)
≤ costW (f) + 6r · |W |, (1)
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where |W | := ∑v∈V Wv.
Moreover by definition of the radius, there is a vertex v with Wv > 0 such that the shortest
path to the closest facility in A has length r. So the cost of f restricted to W is bigger than the
cost restricted to this shortest path:
costW (f) ≥ ( 1
k
· 1 + 1
k
· 2 + . . .+ 1
k
· r) ≥ 1
k
· r(r − 1)/2.
(The fraction 1k appears because a vertex can be assigned to at most k players.)
First we consider the case k ≤ n/4. We have
costW (f) ≥ |W | − |A| ≥ a(n/2k − 1) ≥ an/4k.
The first inequality is because the distance of all customers which are not facilites to a facility is
at least one. The second inequality is due to Lemma 1 and |W | is the sum of payoffs of all players
in A.
Note that |W | ≤ n and 2 ≤ a ≤ k . Now if r ≤ √an, then
costW (f ′)
costW (f)
≤ 1 + 6r|W |
costW (f)
≤ 1 + 6r · a · 2n/k
an/4k
= O(r) = O(
√
kn).
And if r ≥ √an, then
costW (f ′)
costW (f)
≤ 1 + 6r|W |
costW (f)
) ≤ 1 + 6r · a · 2n/k
r(r − 1)/2k = O(an/r) = O(
√
kn).
Now we consider case k > n/4. In any equilibrium, the maximum payoff is at most 2n/k.
Moreover the radius r of any Voronoi cell is upper bounded by n/k + 1, otherwise the player with
minimum gain (which is at most n/k) could increase his gain by moving to a vertex which is at
distance at least r from every other facility. Therefore r = O(1). Summing (1) over all stars with
associated partition W , we obtain cost(f ′) ≤ cost(f) + cn, for some constant c. Remark that the
social cost of any equilibrium is at least n− k. Hence, cost(f ′)cost(f) = O(n). 
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Appendix
Lemma 2 For a given strategy profile, let γ be the minimal payoff among all players, i.e: γ :=
min{pi|1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Then this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for all j ∈ Z`:
(i) cj ≤ 2
(ii) dj ≤ 2γ
(iii) If cj = 1 and dj−1 = dj = 2γ then cj−1 = cj+1 = 2.
(iv) If cj−1 = 2, cj = 1, cj+1 = 1 then dj−1 is odd.
If cj−1 = 1, cj = 1, cj+1 = 2 then dj is odd.
Proof: (Necessary) We will show that if a strategy profile does not satisfy one of the conditions
then it is not a Nash equilibrium.
(i) Suppose that there is a vertex uj with cj ≥ 3. Assume dj−1 ≤ dj , the other case is symmetric.
Since there are vertices on the cycle which are not occupied by a player, the payoff of each
player located on uj must be at least 1. Therefore dj ≥ 3. Let u′ be the vertex immediately
after uj in the cycle. We show now that one of the players located at uj can move to u′
and strictly increase his payoff, which would contradict that the strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium. We decompose the distances into dj−1 = 2aj−1 + bj−1 + 1 and dj = 2aj + bj + 1
where 0 ≤ bj−1, bj ≤ 1. By dj ≥ 3 we have aj ≥ 1. By dj−1 ≤ dj we have aj−1 ≤ aj . Now the
payoff of a player in facility uj is
bj−1
cj−1 + cj
+
aj−1 + 1 + aj
cj
+
bj
cj + cj+1
.
And if he moves to u′, his payoff would be
aj + bj +
1− bj
cj
.
In both cases bj = 0 or bj = 1 this new payoff is strictly greater.
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(ii) Suppose that there exists j such that dj ≥ 2γ+ 1. As previous, we decompose dj = 2a+ b+ 1
where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Assume that cj ≤ cj+1, the other case is symmetric. Let u′ be a vertex
between uj and uj+1 and at even distance to uj+1. Note that the number of vertices between
uj and uj+1 except u′ is 2a + b − 1 = 2(a + b − 1) + (1 − b). If a player moves to u′ he will
gain at least a+ b+ 1−b1+cj . Since 2a+ b+ 1 ≥ 2γ + 1, this payoff always greater than γ, so the
player whose payoff is γ has an incentive to dislocate, contradicting that the strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) Assume that cj = 1, dj−1 = dj = 2γ and at least one of cj−1, cj is 1. If a player whose payoff
is γ moves to facility uj , he will gain at least γ − 12 + 1cj−1+2 + 1cj+2 , which is strictly larger
than γ.
(iv) Assume cj = 1 and cj−1 = 2, cj+1 = 1, the other case is symmetric. Now if the distance dj−1
is even, the player located at uj can stricly increase his payoff by moving to a vertex between
uj−1 and uj and at odd distance to uj−1. The idea is that if this player gets a fractional payoff
from some mid-way vertex, he’ll better off sharing it with one, rather than two players.
(Sufficient) We will prove that if a strategy profile satisfies all conditions, then it is a Nash
equilibrium.
(i) By (iii), if a player is alone on his facility then he has no incentive to make a local move — a
move such that the set of his neighbors doesn’t change.
(ii) Without loss of generality, assume that cj ≤ cj+1. If a player moves to a vertex between
facilities uj and uj+1, similarly as above, his payoff will be at most 1 + (a + b − 1) + 1−bcj+1
where dj = 2a+ b+ 1. Since dj ≤ 2γ, this new payoff will be at most γ so the player has no
incentive to move.
(iii) If a player moves from facility ui to facility uj which is not his neighbor (i.e, i /∈ {j−1, j}), he
will gains bj−1cj−1+cj+1 +
aj−1+1+aj
cj+1
+ bjcj+1+cj+1 where dj−1 = 2aj−1+bj−1+1 and dj = 2aj+bj+1.
Again, since (iii), this payoff is less or equal γ.
(iv) Suppose that a player j (from facility uj) moves to one of his facility-neighbor uj+1. If
cj > 1 then the situation is as in the above paragraph. If cj = 1, the distance between
facilities uj−1 and uj+1 becomes dj−1 + dj and number of vertices between these two facilities
can be decomposed as 2(aj−1 + aj) + 1 if bj−1 = bj = 0 or as 2(aj−1 + aj + 1) + (bj−1 +
bj − 1) otherwise. Suppose that this number of vertices is decomposed as the latter. We
have that, the old payoff of player j is bj−1cj−1+1 + (1 + aj−1 + aj) +
bj
cj+1+1
and his new one is
bj−1+bj−1
cj−1+cj+1+1 +
1+(aj−1+aj+1)+aj+1
cj+1+1
+ bjcj+1+1+cj+1 . By definition, the old payoff is at least γ so
aj−1 + aj ≥ γ − 1− bj−1cj−1+1 −
bj
cj+1+1
. Additionally, by (ii), aj+1 ≤ γ − 1. Thus the old payoff
is greater than the new one. Similarly, in case the number of vertices between facilities uj−1
and uj is decomposed as 2(aj−1 + aj) + 1, the old payoff of j is also greater than his new one.
Hence, a player in facility uj has no incentive to move to a facility-neighbor uj+1.

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